The recent protocol signed bilaterally between Britain and Turkey, following the visit to London of Turkish PM, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, confirms a century old tradition of great power Middle Eastern diplomacy, namely, the tradition of concessions to Turkey at the expense of Hellenic interests.

In the early 1960s, Israel, with support from Washington and London, managed to open an embassy in Nicosia by helping the Turkish Cypriots, namely, their Vice Presidential veto powers against President Makarios.1

Most recently, Britain and America conceded Annan plan version 5 to Turkey in order to cajole it into allowing allied troops to enter Saddam’s Iraq from its Kurdish, south east provinces. Even the Turkish Generals admitted that Annan 5 included all of their demands and more, making it an extraordinarily biased document serving the interest of all sides (US, UK, Turkey) except of course those of the Republic of Cyprus and its people. Consequently it was rejected by the citizens of the Republic in the ensuing referendum.

And now we have just experienced a new deal between Britain and Turkey over occupied northern Cyprus, as Britain and the USA is trying once again to keep Turkey out of Mosul.

The protocol signed in London between Prime Minister Brown and Erdogan calls for a strategic partnership by promoting direct commercial, political and economic ties between Britain and the pseudo-state in occupied Cyprus. Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus in summer 1974 in order to bring about the strategic partition of the island and also separating entirely the population on clearly defined ethnic zones. The invasion and continuing occupation was/is not about protecting the Turkish Cypriots of the island, but to protect Turkey in its southern sea and air approaches. Similarly, the protocol signed by the new British Prime Minister is not about “ending the isolation of Turkish Cypriots”, but rather to cajole Turkey to abstain from a military operation in northern Iraq. We see, therefore, that to all these illegal acts, Britain and the US have spared no regrets and continue to do business with Turkey the way they know: by putting their national interests first. But do they?

True, Britain holds on to bases on Cyprus, for now at least, but Turkey strengthens its hold on the occupied northern part of Cyprus and thus increases its bargaining chips in its dealings with the US and other peripheral players (eg Israel) hence has a far more greater power projection capability in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Brown’s action elevates Turkey to a far greater geo-strategic importance than Britain in the region and the recent protocol signed, which deepens the partition of the island, could be seen as a legal expression of the above historical trend contrary to the interests of Great Britain.3 Britain’s interests are served by a united Cyprus and not by a divided one. Turkey, by establishing its hold on the occupied areas of Cyprus, becomes a peripheral power to be reckoned with, whereas Britain shrinks into a secondary role as a micro-manager of regional crises, and a bad one, for that matter.

America, and Britain do not wish to see Turkey in northern Iraq pursuing PKK guerrillas, not simply because they are afraid of a wider conflagration in the Middle East, but because they know that the Turkish army, once in, it will never return back, as it would aim at politically organising the region, thus stopping the Kurds from achieving statehood by exploiting the oil resources of Kirkuk and Mosul. But the fact of the matter is that Turkey, as it did in the past, may well enter northern Iraq in pursuing its political objectives, disregarding the protocol and the ‘swap’ agreed. If this happens then Brown should explain to the British people how this policy has served British interests.

1 Zach Levey, Middle East Review of International Affairs (online), Volume 7, No. 3, September 2003
2 United Nations Resolution 541 (1983):
‘1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus; 2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal…‘
3 Vassilis K Fouskas, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations (online) – Volume 2 Summer 2003

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