Introduction to a Yes or a No vote – a Lobby for Cyprus study

It goes without saying that the referendum vote on Saturday 24 April presents many Greek Cypriots with a very difficult decision. Do they opt to say a resounding “NO” to express their belief that the Annan plan 5 is a patently unfair document in many respects or do they vote “YES” and invest in the hope that with international guarantees to back the plan Cyprus can be apparently re-united and steps taken to permit refugees to either reclaim their properties or accept compensation? The answers lie very much in what the Foundation Agreement actually says.

But here is the real problem and one which we believe all interested parties can agree: the various components of Annan 5 are so complicated to read and to properly understand that the ordinary citizen has become very confused and extremely worried about how to cast his or her vote at this critical time in our history.

Nevertheless, what the voter will have to weigh up is which is the lesser of two evils, voting NO (and doing so in the face of blatant blackmail about what the future holds) to the major and concerted international effort to impose this plan or voting YES to something which clearly legitimises the events of 1974 but also means the return of some lands and the return of some refugees to their homes. Do the positives of this plan really outweigh the negatives?

At Lobby for Cyprus we believe in sticking to the facts and giving the people of Cyprus accurate information about what the documents actually say. We believe that this will assist them to make up their minds, balancing the risks of voting No with the benefits of voting Yes and vice versa. However, as a UK based pressure group established by refugee village organisations to campaign for restoration of human rights in Cyprus, it may assist if we also cast a wider perspective on this important debate.

Looking on from the UK we would pose the following general questions about why this Plan has been presented by the UN and why now:

• The UK has much to gain from seeing the plan succeed. Voting Yes would give electoral legitimacy to the two British bases at Dhekelia and Akrotiri. Without that, questions will soon be asked within the framework of EU membership why this relic from Britain’s colonial past still is imposed on an EU member state. Could this be the true reason for the rush in approving this document before 1 May?
  
  
• Is it a coincidence that at the same time as the Annan plan is on the table, the US is looking to impose on the Palestinians a similar solution. Is the Cyprus solution to be the blueprint for future disputes where land is returned for the apparent exchange for “peace”.
  
  
• Greek Cypriots have been issued with stern warnings that voting “NO” would have severe political repercussions, one of these presumably the recognition of Ankara's illegal occupation regime, the “TRNC”. If this were a realistic option does one not think that it would have already happened?

Lobby for Cyprus
20 April 2004

Below follows an analysis by Lobby for Cyprus presenting the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the Annan Plan 5.

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNMENT & CONSTITUTION

Perceived advantages
Cypriots would decide their future through a referendum. Once again Cyprus would be a unified state. The Cyprus problem would finally be resolved. However, there is a different point of view that this plan will legally divide the island into two constituent parts, rather than unite it.

Disadvantages
The term Cyprus is to be understood in the sense of the island of Cyprus excluding the Sovereign Base Areas (Appendix A, Annex 1, Article 46 Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic). This means that by voting YES in the referendum, the people of Cyprus would give electoral legitimacy, which does not currently exist, to the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee, meaning that the Cypriots voluntarily agree that the UK Sovereign Base Areas belong forever to the United Kingdom and that Turkey has special rights in Cyprus and can therefore legally intervene in the affairs of Cyprus whenever Turkey believes it should do so.

Greek Cypriot refugees who lost their properties but now reside abroad would not be allowed to vote, while at least 50,000 Turkish colonists, illegally sent to Cyprus by Ankara to alter the demography of the island, will vote. This violates the human rights of the refugees of the Diaspora for the second time. They were evicted by the invading Turkish army and left Cyprus not through choice and the referendum denies them the right to have a say on the future of their country. Previously, the Council of Europe has declared elections in the occupied areas illegal and undemocratic.

The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus would cease to exist. In its place would be 3 new states, being: The United Cyprus Republic (named the Common State), and two Component States (the Greek Cypriot & Turkish Cypriot internal states). There would be 3 parliaments, 3 presidents, 3 constitutions, 3 vetoes, 3 citizenships, 3 flags, 3 anthems, and 3 civil service administrations. There would be equal status of the constituent states and the federal government. The constituent states would fully respect and not infringe upon the powers and functions of each other. There would be no hierarchy between federal and constituent state laws (Appendix A, Article 2, Main Articles Foundation Agreement).

The Office of Head of State of the United Cyprus Republic is to vested in the Presidential Council (Appendix A, Main Articles, Article 5, of Foundation Agreement). The President of the Council would represent the Presidential Council as Head of State. Any representative of the United Cyprus Republic at international meetings would be bound by decisions of the Presidential Council (Appendix A, Annex 1, Article 2) i.e Cyprus would be run by committee.

The Head of State would rotate between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots every twenty calendar months (Appendix A, Annex 1, Article 27, p32). The Federal Government would be set-up so that there is 50-50 equal power sharing between Greek & Turkish Cypriots. These 50-50 power sharing arrangements apply to the Presidential Council , the two chambers of the Federal Parliament, whilst the Supreme Court would be divided 33-33-33 between Greek, Turkish and Non-Cypriots judges, ensuring that non-Cypriot judges would have the casting votes for resolving deadlock in government. How can democracy work in such circumstances?

Note: Turkish Cypriots who comprised only 18% of indigenous population (as at 1974) or 9% (as in 2004) would have 50% share of political power.

The Constitution of Cyprus can be amended only by separate majority from both Components states (Appendix A, Annex 1, Article37, p38) i.e Greek and Turkish Cypriots would have a veto over constitutional reform.

SECURITY & GUARANTEES

Perceived Advantages
The United Cyprus Republic would be demilitarised (Appendix A, Annex 1, article 6, p20) and the new state of affairs would forbid the union of Cyprus in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession. In addition, the UN Security Council would endorse the Foundation Agreement (Appendix D – Matters to be submitted to the United Nations Security Council for Decision p171). However, there is no true demilitarisation. See Disadvantages 2 & 3 below.

Turkey re-affirms its pledge to resist any attack or aggression against the independence or territorial integrity of Cyprus (Appendix C, Annex IV: Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance, p157). However, Turkey has a remarkable history for never complying with its promises, so there is no reason to think that she will do so this time.

Disadvantages
On 1 April 2004, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly that Turkey is unfit to join the EU, citing a long list of concerns, including torture, lack of democracy, imprisonment of political opponents, the influence of the army, persecution of minorities including Kurds and Christians (EU Parliament Resolution 1 April 2004). Despite this assessment by the EU, it is envisaged that Turkey should be a guarantor power for the peace of Cyprus.

Up to 6,000 Turkish troops are allowed to stay until 2011, and reduce to 3000 by 2018 or on Turkey’s accession to the EU whichever is sooner. Thereafter, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey would review troop levels every five years with the objective of total withdrawal (Appendix C, Annex IV, Article , p157)

Up to 50 battle tanks, 180 infantry fighting vehicles, 18 towed artillery pieces, 18 air defence missiles, 6 transport helicopters, 4 light helicopters, 17 light armoured vehicles and 16 air defence cannons would be stationed in the Turkish Cypriot state for use by the Turkish army. Greece would have the same armaments in the Greek Cypriot state (Appendix C, Annex IV: Codicil, Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance p159)

The UN mandate in Cyprus would be to monitor the implementation of the Foundation Agreement and use its best efforts to promote compliance. The UN would use its best efforts to ensure fair and equal treatment under the law for persons from one constituent state by the authorities of the other (Appendix E – Matters to be submitted to the United Nations Security Council for Decision, p171). However, would this really be a guarantee for peace, as the UN troops were present in strength in 1974. The UN force would not have any enforcement powers and would be a toothless tiger.

The Treaty of Guarantee would be amended to cover the new state of affairs, so that Turkey in addition to guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the United Cyprus Republic, would also guarantee the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the constituent states (Appendix C, Annex III: Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Guarantee). This would make it legally possible for Turkish troops to intervene in Greek and Turkish Cypriot affairs. (It should be noted that today, Turkey is obliged to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, though it is doing exactly the opposite through its illegal occupation of one third of the island.)

Until the accession of Turkey to the European Union, the United Cyprus Republic would not put its territory at the disposal of international military operations except with the consent of Greece and Turkey, in addition to the consent of the governments of both constituent states (Appendix A, Annex 1, Article 53 p 45).

PROPERTY & HUMAN RIGHTS

Perceived Advantages
The EU’s three fundamental principles of ownership, movement and settlement would apply to the whole island, except where limited by the Foundation Agreement (Appendix A, Main Articles, Article 4 Fundamental Rights& Liberties, p9). However, Turkey’s success in getting 19 year long derogations, will mean that Cyprus will be the only country in Europe not to benefit from the EU’s three fundamental freedoms.

8% of occupied areas would be returned to Greek Cypriot rule, allowing 80,000 out of 180,000 refugees to return within 3 and a half years. 20,000 other refugees would be allowed to return home under Turkish Cypriot rule over a period of 18 years. The Turkish army would be reduced from 40,000 to 3,000 in 18 years, whilst the Turkish colonists would be reduced from 100,000 to 90,000 just. However, there is no guarantee that Turkey will return land over the time specified and whilst there are limits to the number of refugees able to return, virtually all the Turkish colonists can stay.

Disadvantages
The United Cyprus Republic would inform the European Court of Human Rights that the United Cyprus Republic would be the sole responsible State Party and request the Court to strike out any proceedings currently being dealt with concerning affected property, in order to allow the domestic mechanism agreed to solve these cases to proceed (Appendix A, Annex VII, Article 5, p97). This is despite the fact that Turkey was found guilty by the European Court of Human rights of violating the rights of Greek Cypriot property owners, in the landmark Loizidou v Turkey case of 1996. The Cypriots would therefore be in the unique position of being the only EU citizens who will be denied the jurisdiction of the ECHR.

80,000 Greek Cypriot refugees would be denied the right to return home and would be forced to accept compulsory compensation for two thirds of their lands. Some 20,000 refugees would be allowed to return under Turkish Cypriot rule but with harsh limits to their fundamental rights and liberties (Appendix A, Main Articles, Article 4) as well as harsh limits to their property rights (Appendix A, Annex VII, whole chapter).

Territory to be handed back would be transferred in 6 phases lasting three and a half years to allow some 80,000 refugees to return (Appendix A, Annex VI, Article 3). Returning refugees would be deprived of their former businesses, for example in Morfou some 10,000 refugees can return but without access to their orange groves or to the Bay of Morfou. In Famagusta some refugees would return but Famagusta Port would not be returned.

55% of the coastline of Cyprus would be under Turkish Cypriot Administration.

60% of the natural resources of the island would be located in the Turkish Cypriot state.

30% of the land would be under Turkish Cypriot administration even though only 18% of the indigenous population (as in 1974) or to just 9% (as in 2004) is Turkish Cypriot.

Affected property owned by institutions or by the Church, other than buildings used for religious purposes would be transferred to the Property Board in exchange for compensation (Annex VII, Article 9 – Compensation p 98).

Compensation would be paid in form of compensation bonds and property certificates drawn on a compensation fund, i.e an IOU (Appendix A, Annex VII, Article 8). This in fact means that the cost of compensation would be borne by the Greek Cypriot state ie the victim will pay itself compensation for a crime committed by and outside aggressor, Turkey.

All property belonging to Greek Cypriot refugees used for a purpose in the public interest (Article 10), or required for military purposes (Article 11), or having had a Turkish Cypriot living in it for the last 10 years with the current value of the affected property being no more than 50% more than the current value of the property of which s/he was dispossessed (Article 12), or purchased from a Turkish Cypriot dispossessed owner (Article 13) or having had significant improvements (Article 14) would be transferred to the Property Board in exchange for compensation. This in fact means that few people would be able to reclaim their property, and that those who are entitled to reclaim, will face many problems for many years, thus making it almost impossible to achieve.

Refugees are entitled to re-instatement of their properties within the limits allowed (Article 15). This entitlement does not apply to agricultural land and businesses.

ECONOMY

Perceived Advantages
Greater foreign investment and aid would come to Cyprus following a solution. However, most of this investment will go to the new Turkish Cypriot state.

Disadvantages
Constituent states would be able to set up commercial relations with the rest of the world and to sign agreements. This would cause serious problems for the Federal Government’s management of the economy.

The Turkish Cypriot state would own all airports, airlines and seaports in their state (Appendix A, Annex 1, Article 14, p24). Again, the operation of the central government would be impossible, leading to complete paralysis.

Greek Cypriots would pay nearly all the estimated cost, at £7 billion to the Cypriot economy to implement the Annan plan, less any donations from the international community (Source: Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Cyprus, April 2004).

The majority of EU funds would go to the Turkish Cypriot State until its GDP reaches that of the Greek Cypriot state. The European Union would adopt special measures for the Turkish Cypriot state (Appendix A, Annex IX, Article 6, p138).

The Greek Cypriot refugees’ claim for compensation for loss of use of an affected property for any period commencing with dispossession would be considered by the constituent state which the claimant hails i.e. the Greek Cypriots would pay for their financial losses themselves (Appendix A, Article 21– Compensation for loss of use p103).

Refugees have only one year to lodge claims for compensation, and would need to pay for quantity surveyors, lawyers and other professionals to pursue claims for compensation.

Greek Cypriots would contribute the majority of funds for the Federal Government. The Greek Cypriot state would contribute £270 million a year and the Turkish Cypriot state £30 million a year (Source: Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Cyprus, April 2004).

Turkey would not pay any compensation for the damage it has caused to the economy of Cyprus since 1974.

There would be two internally competing states, vying for central government funds, jobs and investments. The two component states would compete to attract tourists to their respective parts of the island.

The Central Bank would be governed by five members, one of whom would be Governor. At least two members would hail from each component state and the third member may be a non-Cypriot. The Governor and the other members of the Board would be appointed by the Presidential Council (Appendix A, Annex 1, Article 32, page 20).

Cyprus’ International Country Rating is expected to be downgraded following a solution as the poorer Turkish Cypriot state would reduce the overall Cypriot average rating. This would cost the Greek Cypriots more when borrowing money on the international markets.

It is widely expected that property values across Cyprus would fall significantly following a solution due to thousands of properties affected by compulsory purchases.

SOCIAL & OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Perceived Advantages
Following a solution, there will be greater contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, there will be more illegal Turkish colonists than Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus and given that the Turkish Cypriots cannot co-exist with the colonists today, what chance have the Greek Cypriots tomorrow.

Disadvantages
Any dispute about the interpretation or application of this Protocol would be resolved by consultations and would not be referred to any international tribunal or third party for settlement (Appendix C, Article 8, p152).

Turkey makes no apology for invading Cyprus in 1974 and its 30-year illegal occupation.

Note:
after the 1st May 2004, Turkey would be occupying a part of the EU.

Cyprus’ veto against any future Turkish Membership of EU would be removed from the day the Annan Plan is signed.

Citizenship would be awarded by internal component state. After 19 years, there would be no limit to the number of Turkish Citizens allowed to reside in the Turkish Cypriot state (Appendix D, Article 3).

Some 90,000 Turkish colonists would become Cypriot citizens following a YES vote.

Too many important chapters are still blank, to be inserted after plan has been approved. There is no chapter on the Central Bank, Taxation & Finance, Budgets, International Trade, Water and Mineral Resources, or the Constitutions of the two Component States.

At the time of writing, much of the 9000 pages of annexes, appendices and other supporting documents that form an integral part of the Annan Plan are not present on the official United Nations website for the scrutiny of the Cypriot people who need to make a full and informed judgement on all aspects of the Annan plan.

HOME	back to top ^

For further information please contact Lobby via e-mail: admin@lobbyforcyprus.org