"At the end of the day," the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced on 31 March 2004, "it does not matter what I think. It is what the people think that counts. They decide and rightly so."

But given the desperation of the UN, US and EU to impose a solution in Cyprus, even to the extent of producing a blueprint which neither side agreed with, why did they bother with putting the issue to referendum at all? The answer is quite simple. They had to do so!

Those seeking a solution needed a "Yes" vote to convey some semblance of legitimacy upon provisions, which they otherwise knew to be completely unreasonable or of dubious legality. A "yes" vote would have had the legal effect of conferring retrospective consent to the consequences of the Turkish invasion, widening the definition of a Cypriot so that it encompassed the Turkish colonists planted in the occupied area, negating the principles of democracy, limiting the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, preclude Cypriots from asserting basic rights under EU law, authorise through the ballot box a substantial foreign military presence on the island, reinforce Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee 1960 and impose a host of other unfair constraints upon the sovereignty of the United Cyprus Republic, the state which was designed to step into the shoes of the Republic of Cyprus.

Perhaps the most alarming features of Annan 5 were those relating to the Treaty of Guarantee. Under Article IV, Greece, Turkey and the UK each reserve the right, if certain circumstances arise, "to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs" created by the Treaty. It has always been unclear whether such a right was permissible under international law. Even so, as Ambassador Michael Klosson, the US Ambassador in Cyprus, conceded, Annan 5 proposed to "enlarge" the scope of the Treaty of Guarantee so that it "embraced" the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the two constituent states forming the United Cyprus Republic. "That," according to Ambassador Klosson, "is an important enhancement not diminution of Turkey's guarantee."

All of which raises a number of thorny questions. Why should Cypriots be the only people on the planet, let alone the EU, to be subjected to such a guarantee? How could they be expected to place any reliance or faith in a state, which has an appalling track record of violating international law and abusing the human rights of its neighbours and its own citizens?

Why should the Treaty of Guarantee "not be affected" by the accession of Cyprus to the EU, as the British Foreign Office has claimed? Furthermore, how could Article IV be reconciled with the equality of states principle of international law and with Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, the latter of which obliges all UN Members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN"? Indeed, bearing in mind that Article 103 of the Charter provides that "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of Members of the UN under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail", presumably the obligations under the Charter prevail over any right "to take action" under Article IV? Perhaps Ambassador Klosson would care to clarify.

A referendum was forced on Cypriots quite simply because the advocates of Annan 5 were unable to provide satisfactory answers to these questions. Indeed, it took place with a view to legitimise the right under Article IV. Consent can, as a matter of law, and should, as a matter of policy, validate the use of force, so long as the use of force remains within the limits set by the state’s consent.

If Greek Cypriots had voted "Yes" on 24 April, the voters would have run the grave risk of giving the Turkish armed forces a green light to venture south of the green line on any pretext that suited their convenience. Fortunately common sense prevailed and they voted no in the most resounding fashion.

Amidst the debate on the substantive contents of the Annan Plan additional procedural issues raised by the Annan process have been largely overlooked.

The referendum question that was put to the voters was this:

"Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?"

The authenticated version of the "the laws to be in force" were with the UN and out of the public domain until the UN website was updated to include the "authenticated" and "authoritative" version of the Plan together with its annexes and other supporting documents. The relevant page on the official UN website entitled "The Text of the Plan" confirms that it was "last updated on April 23, 2004 at 23:59 GMT".

Two questions of fundamental importance must be asked of the UN and others involved in imposing this referendum on Cypriots.

1. Given the discrepancies appearing in the official UN website when was the full "authenticated" version of the Annan Plan, including its Annexes, finally placed on the UN website?
2. Why did the UN fail to institute a consultation process under which the elected representatives of the voters, their professional advisers and interested parties were asked to scrutinise and comment on the "authenticated" version of the Annan Plan, including its legislation, before the referendum took place?

On 20 April Tony Blair announced to the House of Commons that a referendum would take place in the UK on the question of the EU constitution. The voters of the UK would then be given 18 months to consider the matter before the referendum takes place. In Cyprus the voters were given just over three weeks to consider a 9,000 page plan that would dismantle their country and legalise most of the consequences of the Turkish invasion of 1974. Yet the British Government felt that three weeks constituted a reasonable time for Greek Cypriots to make up their mind.

Would the voters of the UK including newspaper editors, academics and members of the legal profession be satisfied with such a state of affairs when the referendum on the EU constitution takes place in 18 months or so?

On the same day Mr Blair delivered a statement to the House of Commons on his plans in relation to the EU constitutional treaty. 

Amongst other things, he informed the House that:

"Maintenance of control of our affairs is essential in certain areas of policy. The national veto must remain in areas such as taxation, foreign policy, defence, social security, how the essentials of our common law and criminal justice system work, and treaty change, and we will insist on the necessary amendments to the current draft treaty to ensure beyond doubt that it does…" (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 20 April 2004, column 155).

If this principle is good enough for the UK citizens why is it not good enough for the Greek Cypriots?