Turkey and Denktash’s fears

Turkey and Denktash’s fears

The European Union presidential meeting in Copenhagen (December 2002) affirmed Cyprus’ accession to the EU without conditions and gave a firm rebuff to Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU.

Turkey was merely afforded a commitment that its application will be reconsidered in December 2004 to determine whether it has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. This is again likely to be a blocking stone because the true criterion is the ‘application’ of that political criteria and not simply the legislative act of passing the necessary laws. Even more to the point is that a political decision will be made as to whether accession negotiations should begin “without delay” but as everyone knows, that rests on the balance of opinion within the EU as to whether Turkey is wanted or not. At present the balance of opinion is firmly against, led by the Franco-German axis. Britain and the US could not pressure the EU to think otherwise at the Heads of State summit to think otherwise; just as the USA would never seriously contemplate incorporating Mexico in its borders, so too the EU would never seriously entertain incorporating Turkey in its borders.

There are sufficient reasons to block Turkey’s entry: the economic drain it would inflict and the sheer cost of modernising the country; the political ramifications of Turkey having the single biggest representation of any country in EU institutions; the likely movement of millions of people seeking work and prosperity in Europe, particularly France and Germany and, of course the perceived cultural, political and religious divides. Besides, the Copenhagen summit extended

and broadened the existing Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey. Arguably, the former is getting what it wants from Turkey without need for its accession. This is probably nearer the truth so that even if accession negotiations begin “without delay” come December 2004, they can be drawn out for years to come. Turkey, for historical, cultural, political and economic reasons is simply not wanted and the scenario is not likely to change.

Another concern for Turkey and Denktash is that the island as a whole is being admitted to the EU, though EU governance in the occupied area has been suspended temporarily because of Turkey’s illegal occupation. This means that Denktash’s dream of a sovereign state has been dashed and with it his ability to form a separate and strategic alliance with Turkey. The ‘TRNC’ cannot and will not be, and this is a bitter pill for Denktash to swallow.

As a follow on from this, Cyprus will be subject to EU laws and norms from 2003, and this most assuredly causes deep concern for Denktash and Turkey. The currently occupied area, should it become a federated/confederated state under the terms of a settlement, will be subject to EU jurisdiction.

Any ambitions or designs Turkey or Denktash may entertain concerning the island’s affairs will be effectively counterbalanced by the legal, political and military reality of Cyprus being part of the territory of the federal state of Europe. The Europeans will not be afraid to exercise their authority in the island’s affairs. Given the perceived strategic importance of Cyprus to Turkey, it must rankle with Ankara that to even threaten the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus would, de facto, threaten the very security and territorial integrity of the European Union. It matters little about preserving the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance (1960); the reality is that the EU has from now a legitimate strategic interest in Cyprus. Post-settlement, the ‘entire’ island becomes part of that wider strategic European profile – Turkey will eventually but effectively be displaced from the island.

It is also the case that as long as Cyprus’ jurisdiction is derived from the EU, any settlement that purports to remove the legal rights of the Greek Cypriots will be subject to legal and political challenge. As the plan stands, it is so full of patent injustices and unacceptable impositions that it will be besieged by repeated challenges. All it will require is one case, one successful redress to upset the apple cart. After all, no legislative act or political document is above the law – the UN plan cannot take away legal rights because it chooses to do so. And as long as France, Germany and the Scandinavian countries in particular champion their interests and beliefs, Denktash and Turkey can never feel secure about any deal concerning Cyprus.

Thus, in spite of the obvious attractions of the deal to Turkey and Denktash, they do have deep concerns and fears much to do with the fait accompli of Cyprus’ imminent accession to the EU.